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h, which are defined as a sharp rise in 
volatility of real per capita GDP growth rates immediately following disasters. This paper makes three contributions. 
First, we analytically demonstrate that if and only if the degree of relative prudence is higher than 2, risks after 
disasters decrease equity premiums. Second, we find that the differences between equity premiums with and without 
risks after disasters are quantitatively significant. Third, equity premiums are still higher in the case of disaster than 
without a disaster.
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     1. Introdctuion
Many researchers pay serious attention to the potential impacts of disasters on
equity premiums. Disasters are deﬁned as events such as wars, severe depressions
and natural disasters, which are infrequent but signiﬁcantly reduce real per capita
GDP growth rates. Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) argued that representative agent
models generate large equity premiums, if disasters are independently and iden-
tically distributed (hereafter, i.i.d.). On the other hand, Gourio (2008) examined
the fact that historically observed disasters tended to be followed by sharp rises
in real per capita GDP growth rates (hereafter, “recoveries”). Then he demon-
strated that disasters with possible recoveries generated small equity premiums,
if the degree of intertemporal elasticity of substitutions (hereafter, IES) was high.
However, as discussed in a later section, historically observed disasters tended to
be followed by persistent declines in real per capita GDP growth rates as well as
by recoveries. In other words, disasters tended to be followed by sharp rises in
volatility of real per capita GDP growth rates (hereafter, “risks after disasters”).
This paper studies the eﬀects of such risks after disasters on equity premiums.
Then it demonstrates that precautionary saving, rather than IES, plays an impor-
tant role in determining the equity premiums. In particular, using a three-period
Lucas tree model, we analytically demonstrate that risks after disasters decrease
equity premiums if and only if the degree of relative prudence (hereafter, RP)1 is
higher than 2. This result suggests that ignoring risks after disasters causes com-
puted equity premiums to be too large. In fact, introducing risks after disasters
into Barro’s disaster model, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerences between equity premi-
ums with and without risks after disasters are quantitatively signiﬁcant. However,
we also ﬁnd that the equity premiums are still higher than in the case where no
disaster occurs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs a three-period Lucas
tree economy and analyzes the eﬀects of risks after disasters on equity premiums.
Section 3 introduces risks after disasters into Barro’s disaster model and explores
quantitative eﬀects of precautionary saving on equity premiums. Section 4 oﬀers
a conclusion.
2. A three-period economy with risks after disasters
In order to analyze the eﬀects of risks after disasters on equity premiums, we
construct a three-period Lucas tree economy. In this economy, there are two
assets. One is an equity share in a Lucas tree, which produces a single perishable
consumption good as a dividend, and the other is a risk-free asset. In period 2, the
normal state (n) occurs with a probability of 1¡p and the disaster state (d) occurs
with a probability of p. Once the normal state is realized in period 2, there is no
uncertainty in period 3. On the other hand, if the disaster state is realized in period
2, the dividend in period 3 is uncertain. The parameters yn
2 and yn
3 represent the
1RP is a measure of precautionary saving proposed by Kimball (1990).
1dividends of the Lucas tree in periods 2 and 3, when the normal state is realized
in period 2, whereas yd
2 and ˜ yd
3 represent the dividends in periods 2 and 3, when
the disaster state is realized in period 2. We assume that yn
2 > yd
2. ˜ yd
3 is a random
variable, where ¯ y ´ E[˜ yd
3] and ±2 ´ E[(˜ yd
3 ¡ ¯ y)2]. The parameter ± represents risks
after disasters2. E[¢] denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional
on information available in period 1. The parameter y1 represents the dividend of
the Lucas tree in period 1. We assume that there are no idiosyncratic risks.
The parameters x1 and a1 represent agents’ holdings of the equity share and
the risk-free asset in period 1. P1 and Q1 represent the prices of the equity and
the risk-free asset in period 1. xs
t and as
t represent agents’ holdings of the equity
share and the risk-free assets in period t = 2;3 and state s = n;d, and P s
2 and
Qs
2 represent the prices of the equity and the risk-free asset in period 2 and state
s = n;d.
The representative agent maximizes his/her expected utility subject to budget
constraints:
















The parameter c1 represents consumption in period 1 and cs
t represents consump-
tion in period t = 2;3 and state s = n;d. We assume that the periodic utility
u(¢) has positive ﬁrst and negative second derivatives; that is, u0 > 0 and u00 < 0.
For simplicity, we ignore the subjective time preference. The budget constraints
in periods 1, 2, and 3 are as follows: c1 + P1x2 + Q1a2 = (P1 + y1)x1 + a1,
cs
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3xd
3 + ad
3. Then ﬁrst-order conditions determine the asset prices, as follows:






























































Hereafter, scaling u0(¢) so that, without loss of generality, u0(y1) = 1.
Market clearing conditions are x1 = xs
t = 1, and a1 = as
t = 0 for t = 2;3 and
s = n;d. Then, consumption always equals dividend: c1 = y1, cs
2 = ys
2; for s = n;d,
cn
3 = yn
3, and ˜ cd
3 = ˜ yd







P1 and Rf = 1
Q1. We deﬁne the expected equity premium
as Π ´ Re
Rf. Then equilibrium equity premiums are deﬁned as follows3:
Π ´
A + ® ˆ P
B + p ˆ P
; (1)
2While we assume that the level of the dividend in period 3 after the disaster state is uncertain,































2) + p2, B ´ (1 ¡ p)yn
3u0(yn





2), and ˆ P ´ E[˜ yd
3u0(˜ yd
3)]. ˆ P is the equity price in the disaster
state, P d
2, multiplied by marginal utility in the disaster state, u0(yd
2). However, we
hereafter refer to ˆ P as the equity price in the disaster state.
Below, we analyze the eﬀects of an increase in the risks after disasters, ±, on
the equity price, ˆ P, and the equity premium, Π.
Proposition 1 When the degree of relative prudence, ¡¯ y
u000(¯ y)
u00(¯ y) is higher (lower)
than 2, ˆ P is an increasing (decreasing) function of ±, for small ±.
Proof. Taking a Taylor series expansion of ˆ P around ¯ y gives4:











2 + o(˜ y
3):










u00(¯ y) > (<)2 implies u00(¯ y) +
¯ y
2u000(¯ y) > (<)0, thus @ ˆ P
@± > (<)0. (Q.E.D.)
Proposition 1 implies that there are two opposite eﬀects of risks after disasters
on the equity price, ˆ P. On the one hand, risks after disasters lower equity prices
because of risk aversion (u00(¯ y)). On the other hand, risk after disasters raises
equity prices because of precautionary saving (
¯ y
2u000(¯ y)). Thus, u00(¯ y) +
¯ y
2u000(¯ y)
determines the total eﬀects of risks after disasters on equity prices, ˆ P. In fact, if
RP, ¡¯ y
u000(¯ y)
u00(¯ y), proposed by Kimball (1990) is higher than 2, u00(¯ y) +
¯ y
2u000(¯ y) > 0
holds.
Proposition 2 Π is a decreasing function of ˆ P.





(B + p ˆ P)2: (2)









































2) < 1 always holds because of concavity of utility functions.
Thus, @Π
@ ˆ P < 0. (Q.E.D.)
4o(˜ y3) refers to a higher-order term.
5Derivations of equation (3) are described in the Appendix.
3Proposition 2 argues that a rise in the equity prices in the disaster state implies
that an equity share becomes less risky and lowers the equity premiums. This
is intuitive because increases in ˆ P mitigate capital losses on the occurrence of
disasters, when consumption is low and marginal utility is high.
We thus have a key proposition of this paper.
Proposition 3 : When the degree of relative prudence, ¡¯ y
u000(¯ y)
u00(¯ y), is higher (lower)
than 2, Π is a decreasing (increasing) function of ±, for small ±.




@± < (>)0. (Q.E.D.)
Proposition 3 suggests that precautionary saving plays an important role in
determining equity premiums in the context of risks after disasters. In particular,
Proposition 3 suggests that when RP is higher than 2, ignoring risks after disasters
makes calibrators overestimate the equity premiums. If RP is lower than 2, the
opposite occurs.
These propositions hold in the case of possible recoveries, as discussed in Gourio
(2008), because these propositions are independent of the magnitude relationship
between ¯ y and yd
2. In addition, we can easily show that these propositions hold in
the case of government default as discussed in Barro (2006)6.
Finally, we oﬀer some examples of well-known utility functions.
Example 1 The quadratic utility implies that third derivatives are zero; that is,
there is no precautionary saving. Thus, risks after disasters always increase equity
premiums.
Example 2 The HARA (Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion) utility is usually


























. Thus, RP > 2 implies that
RRA > 2
1¡´
2¡´ in the case of ´ < 1.
Example 3 In the case of CRRA (Constant Relative Risk Aversion) utility, RP =
2 implies that the degree of relative risk aversion (hereafter, RRA) equals 1, which
is the case of the log utility. That is, when a calibrator uses the CRRA utility
with a moderate degree of RRA, ignoring the risks after disasters caused computed
equity premiums to be too large.
However, the propositions in this section are based on Taylor expansion ar-
guments for a small ±. In section 3, then, we conduct calibration exercises and
evaluate quantitatively the eﬀects of empirically plausible degree of risks after dis-
asters on equity premiums.
6Barro (2006) computed equity premiums using equity returns and defaultable government
bond returns instead of risk-free rates.
43. Calibration: Barro model with risks after disasters
To explore the quantitative eﬀects of precautionary saving on equity premiums, we
introduce risks after disasters into Barro’s disaster model. Barro’s disaster model
is the inﬁnitely lived representative agent model with CRRA utility.
To conduct calibration exercises, we begin by characterizing empirically plau-
sible degrees of risks after disasters from cross-country evidence of real per capita
GDP growth rates in disasters presented by Barro (2006, Table I, p.828-829).
Duration of disasters is distributed between one and eight years with a mode of
three years. Then, we deﬁne three years from the beginning of the disaster as a
disaster period and the succeeding three years as an aftermath period. Figure 1
shows a histogram of real per capita GDP growth rates during the disaster and
the aftermath period, where the growth rates in the disaster period are lower than
-10%7.
From Figure 1, we ﬁnd that growth rates in the disaster period are distributed
between -50% and -10% with a mode of -20%. On the other hand, growth rates in
the aftermath period are distributed between -40% and 50% with a mode of 10%.
Thus, we ﬁnd that disasters tended to be followed by persistent declines in real
per capita GDP growth as well as recoveries. In other words, disasters tended to
be followed by a sharp rise in risks after disasters. In fact, the average growth rate
in the aftermath period is 10.06% and the standard deviation is 21.73%.
Figure 1. Cross-countries distribution of real per-capita GDP growth









We introduce risks after disasters into Barro’s disaster model. Consumption
growth follows:
∆logct = ¹ + (¾ + ±st)²t; with probability 1 ¡ p
= ¹ + ¾²t + log(1 ¡ b); with probability p
where the parameter ²t represents i.i.d. standard normal random variables with a
distribution of N(0,1) and b represents the size of disasters. If the previous period
is a disaster, st = 1, otherwise, st = 0. That is, risks after disasters are ¾+± while
risks in normal times are ¾. If ± = 0, the model is the same as that of Barro.
7From Maddison’s (2003) data, we limit our study to 46 events in 27 countries.
5Because it is diﬃcult to obtain an analytical solution in the case of ± 6= 0, we must
use a numerical technique to compute equity premiums.
Following Barro, we specify the calibration parameters as presented in Table
I. In our setup, since the duration of a disaster is stochastic, we do not use the
historical distribution of b but the single value b = 43:15% in order to replicate
Barro’s equity premium if there are no risks after disasters. From Figure 1, since
standard deviation of consumption growth in the aftermath period is 21.73%, we
compute equity premiums when ± is between 3% and 23% with an increment of
5%. Table I reports results from the default considered equity premiums.
Table I. Equity-risk premiums (the case of bond default) (%)
no disasters disasters
Total risks after disasters: ± + ¾ 2 5 10 15 20 25
RRA: ° = 4 0.16 3.53 3.48 3.18 2.95 2.43 1.67
RRA: ° = 1 0.04 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.45 0.49
subjective time preference ½ = 0:03, average growth ¹ = 2:5%,
standard deviation of consumption growth in normal times ¾ = 2%,
the probability of occurrence of disasters p = 1:7%,
and the default probability of government bonds in disaster q = 40%.
When RRA = 4, the equity premiums equal 0.16% in the case where no dis-
aster occurs, 5.71% in the case of disaster, and 3.53% in the case of disaster with
bond default. Risks after disasters lower equity premiums because of strong pre-
cautionary saving. In particular, the default considered equity premium is 2.43%
when ¾ + ± = 20% and 1.67% when ¾ + ± = 25%. These values indicate that the
diﬀerences in the equity premiums with and without risks after disasters are quan-
titatively signiﬁcant. In addition, we ﬁnd that the larger risks after disasters imply
smaller equity premiums. Thus, these calibration exercises demonstrate that we
must pay serious attention to potential impacts of risks after disasters. However,
we also ﬁnd that equity premiums are much higher in the case of disasters than
the case where no disasters occur. Table I also reports the results in the case of log
utility, where RP equals 2. In this case, while risks after disasters always increase
equity premiums, magnitudes are very low.
4. Conclusion
This paper studies the eﬀects of risks after disasters on equity premiums. On
the one hand, we demonstrate that ignoring risks after disasters causes computed
equity premiums to be too large, if and only if RP is higher than 2. In addition,
we ﬁnd that the diﬀerences in equity premiums with and without risks after dis-
asters are quantitatively signiﬁcant. In fact, many calibration exercises in asset
pricing literature tended to employ CRRA utility with RRA higher than 2, and
some empirical researchers found that RP is higher than 28. Thus, we must pay
8For example, Merrigan and Normadin (1996) showed that the estimated RP took a value of
around 2 in U.K. Hori and Shimizutani (2006) estimated that RP is around 4 in Japan. On the
other hand, Dynan (1993) found that the estimated RP is very low in U.S.
6serious attention to potential impacts of risks after disasters. On the other hand,
the equity premiums are much higher than in the case where no disaster occurs.
Thus, these results are quantitatively instructive because disaster models proposed
by Rietz and Barro are potentially important. Therefore, future research should
investigate whether historically observed disasters were empirically or statistically
consistent with historically observed equity premiums and other asset prices.
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Appendix
Derivation of the equation (1) We describe the derivation of the equation
(1) in detail. Using the deﬁnition of asset prices and the ﬁrst order conditions, the





(1 ¡ p)(P n
2 + yn



































































































































Thus, the denominator is written as B + p ˆ P, where











































































































































































































































As a result, we derive equation (1), that is, Π ´ A+® ˆ P
B+p ˆ P .














































































2(1 ¡ p) ¡ p(1 ¡ p)












































































Thus, the sign condition is written as equation (3),





























































2) < 1, the term in bracket is negative, which implies that the
sign condition is negative.
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